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Abstract 
 
Focusing on Hegel’s engagement with Kant’s theoretical philosophy, the paper 
shows the merits of its characterisation as “completion”. The broader aim is to 
offer a fresh perspective on familiar historical arguments and on contemporary 
discussions of philosophical naturalism by examining the distinctive combina-
tion of idealism and naturalism that motivates the priority both authors accord 
to the topics of testability of philosophical claims and of the nature of the rela-
tion between philosophy and the natural science. Linking these topics is a ques-
tion about how the demands of unification—imposed internally, relative to 
conceptions of the proper conduct of philosophical enquiry—can accommodate 
realism, a key element in establishing disciplinary parity between philosophy 
and the natural sciences. The distance that ultimately marks Kant’s and Hegel’s 
answers to this question justifies the interpretative claim about completion, 
while the conceptual patterns exemplified in the posing of the question and in 
their shared assumptions about its philosophical importance justifies the recon-
structive claim about “idealist naturalism”. 
 
Keywords: Naturalism, Unification, Realism, Actuality, Regulative and Constitu-
tive ideas, System, Dialectic. 
 
 
I believe that everything that happens  
is natural even if we do not 
 know the cause of it  
(Sophie to Leibniz, 20/30 October 1691)1  
 
 
 
1. Introduction: Idealist Naturalism 
Characteristic of philosophical naturalism is the aspiration to bring philosophy 
close to the natural sciences. From a historical perspective, particularly 
interesting is a set of projects that seek to naturalise philosophy in order to 	
1 Leibniz 2011: 101. 
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secure its traditional ambitions in synthetic theory construction. The aim is to 
establish continuity between philosophy and the natural sciences not through 
methodological convergence or reduction, but by assigning to the natural 
sciences the role of an external tribunal on substantive philosophical claims.2 A 
well-discussed example, which illustrates how such a tribunal might function, 
uses STR, a scientific theory that does not privilege any frame of reference as 
giving the real or most fundamental answer. STR counts against the philosophi-
cal position of presentism, which states that only what is present exists; natural 
sciences can be called to adjudicate a philosophical dispute.3  
The historical positions I want to discuss in this paper share the concern 
with testing substantive a priori claims—for Kant, left unchecked, pure reason 
risks stultification by antinomy, for Hegel, thought without proper bounds de-
generates to mere abstraction and indeterminateness4—yet, instead of turning to 
natural science for help, they undertake to renew metaphysics, by showing that 
philosophy is capable of self-testing and has a legitimate claim to disciplinary 
autonomy.  
Without ignoring the force of socio-historical reasons, such as the worldly 
success and academic prestige of the natural sciences, there is an important the-
oretical reason that explains the modern move towards science. Functioning as 
a hidden premise is the Humean thought that reason does not have its own do-
main. If this is accepted, then one can engage in any number of critical renewals 
of metaphysics, without seeing a point in defending the disciplinary autonomy 
of philosophy. 5 The purpose of the paper is to show what happens when this 
premise is not accepted in conjunction with acceptance of the need for testing 
philosophical claims and for proximity to the natural sciences. This conceptual 
space is occupied, I will argue, by Kant and Hegel. This claim does not amount 
to and does not aspire to be a novel interpretation of their work, it is rather an 
attempt to cast some familiar arguments in a different light, that cast by the dis-
cernibly similar concerns of a group of contemporary naturalists. The main ad-
vantage of this way of presenting matters is the broadening of the context of jus-
tification of certain idealist theses, beyond the historical one of their gestation 
and formulation. To emphasise this point I shall refer to “idealist naturalism” as 
a genus with two species.6 I introduce below the salient features of the genus by 	
2 For a representative range of views that explicitly link meta-philosophical issues, such 
as those outlined here, with a favoured version of the relation between philosophy and 
science characteristic of contemporary philosophical naturalism, see Hawley 2006, 
Maudlin 2007, Papineau 2011. I am not implying that the scientific tribunal is the only 
tool in the contemporary naturaliser’s critical arsenal, but it is prominent among meta-
physical naturalisers. 
3 The rejection of presentism does not render the competing position, eternalism, true. 
For illuminating discussion of this example that highlights the complexities of what I call 
here, using Kant’s metaphor, a “tribunal” see Hawley 2006. 
4 The indeterminacy of bad metaphysics is vividly illustrated in the “Preface” to the Phe-
nomenology of Spirit as “the night where all cows are black” (Hegel 2005: 94). 
5 The thought here is that criticism of metaphysics does not amount to its rejection; the 
point is nicely made in Callender 2011.  
6 Unless otherwise indicated by the context of the discussion and stated explicitly, e.g. 
footnote 16, I will not be using “naturalism” in any of its bewildering varieties; since I 
find I am in agreement with those who doubt the usefulness of general applications of the 
term in philosophy; see M. De Caro’s Introduction to Putnam 2016. 
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focusing on a small methodological difference with substantive implications 
about the nature of the task at hand. This difference marks out decisively the 
idealist from the contemporary naturalist; simply put, the nature of the continui-
ty between philosophy and the natural sciences gives rise to a first order task, 
whereas the testing of philosophical claims, without cutting philosophy off from 
all other disciplines, with analogous claims to adding to our cognitive stock, is a 
second order task. 
(i) “Continuity”, as I shall use the term from now on, describes a first order 
philosophical task; philosophy must offer support for the work of the natural sci-
ences. Specifically, philosophy must make available to empirical science a realis-
tic account of the relation of thought and nature that does not require supernat-
ural appeal (to a divine epistemic guarantor for example). If philosophy suc-
ceeds in this task, the gain is twofold: science is explanatorily self-sufficient and 
it is informative about things, not about the ideas in the mind. 
(ii) “Testing” describes a second order task: to ensure that the content of a priori 
reasoning is sound. The reason that testing is plausibly an internal matter is re-
lated to the first order task. On the one hand, the sort of realism sketched as de-
sideratum for the first order task may be unobtainable. So that task may fail. It 
is, however, a possible task for philosophy. This not a historical concession. Ra-
ther philosophy can engage in the supportive task because the two disciplines be-
long to the same genus: rationally organised thought. Once this is foregrounded, 
it is not unreasonable to expect that philosophy will have something to say 
about the nature of this genus. Asking philosophy to say something about the 
nature of thought is not outrageous, but does assume a degree of faith in philos-
ophy’s own critical tools and methods. Internal testing in turn presupposes a de-
gree of disciplinary autonomy.  
But now it should be obvious that the challenge consists in holding (i) and 
(ii) together; other things being equal, one has still to establish the downward 
transition from setting out what is philosophically achievable—the second order 
task about the nature of thought in general and its implications for sub-species of 
the genus—to the first order task. The challenge is to show how and why what-
ever is found to belong to the genus of rationally organised thought has anything 
to do with the world we found.7  
 
2. Kant: Unity and the World 
A more prosaic way of saying that philosophical claims answer to a philosophi-
cal tribunal is to say that philosophy has its own method, specifically that it has 
a method that is distinct from those of the natural sciences. The question then 
arises how can the claims its tribunal vindicates have any bearing on the natural 
sciences? Kant’s answer is that internally tested claims about the fundamental 
character of rational thought, whether such thought is justified a priori or a poste-
riori, yield results that also have a role in sustaining realism about the relation 
between thought and nature. I will seek to show what counts in favour of this 
bold claim by reconstructing first Kant’s response to the second order problem 
about testing and in the following section his defence of realism that addresses 
continuity.  	
7 I take the phrase, “the world we found”, from Sacks 1989. 
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2.1. Unification as a Goal of Science and of System 
Kant solves the problem of testing of philosophical claims by providing a cogni-
tive goal, which names a value that is sought across all domains of rationally or-
ganised thought that aims to yield cognitive gains. The assumption that there is 
one such goal is debatable.8 Contextually, however, the idea that there is a single 
goal to enquiry that can also function as its guiding value, to which any other val-
ues are subordinate, makes sense in light of the goal articulated by Kant’s rational-
ist predecessors, to map in a systematic way asymmetrical ground/grounded rela-
tions; attaining this goal enables the enquirer to realise the value of full rational 
transparency about all phenomena. One important formulation of this epistemic 
goal presented as a principle that directs enquiry is PSR, the principle of suffi-
cient reason. In some of its stronger interpretations, in Leibniz, PSR motivates 
the search for a reason that is causally powerful as well as explanatorily com-
plete and given the demandingness of the “why?” question only a supernatural 
reason that combines creative power and elective rationality can satisfy.9 One of 
the results of Kant’s testing of philosophical claims is that such reason is una-
vailable. From an external perspective, that Kant reaches this result is of minor 
interest, if reaching it requires other commitments that, other positions which 
consider themselves theoretically less burdened with such traditional expecta-
tions; I will consider some of these arguments, to see how Kant’s position holds 
against them.  
Kant’s solution to the second order problem about testing is to accept the 
intuitive appeal of PSR but turn the principle on its head. PSR assumes that 
there is a systematic whole and sets the task of enquiry as tracing the connec-
tions that sustain the whole. Kant makes “unification” a goal for thought (Ein-
heit).10 Very generally put, the aim of rationally organised thought is the attain-
ment of unity (see Ak 18:225). The basic function of unity is the identification of 
a domain of enquiry through general rules that characterise the objects belong-
ing to the domain, concepts that are appropriate for these objects, in the sense 
that they yield claims that can be adjudicated within the domain and set the 
standard of epistemic expectations appropriate to the domain.11 Compared to 	
8 A good reference here is Thomas Kuhn (1977: 330-39), who in attempting to mitigate 
the impression of his influential theory of scientific revolution, sought to identify objec-
tive values, such as accuracy, consistency, simplicity, scope and fruitfulness, which have 
a good claim in fact to drive cognitive efforts in science, but more important can form a 
sort of scientific virtue ethics for choice theory. Though Kuhn does not use this terminol-
ogy, his alertness to the development of each virtue, interpretative nuances and the diffi-
culties of having maximal instances of all in each case suggest sympathy with a virtue-
ethicist approach.  
9 By “explanatorily complete”, I mean a thesis that connects truth and explanation: given 
some proposition the true reason that explains it belongs to a whole chain of reasons that 
even for contingent truths is ultimately a priori and dependent on the divine creative act 
and choice (see VE II 275-78; Gr 287-91 and GIV 427-63).  
10 Einheit of course is “unity”. I use “unification” to describe the project of unifying, its 
conditions, rules and degrees of attainment, that allow the value to be variously realisa-
ble. The significance of this will emerge at the end of this section. 
11 To clarify: epistemic expectations are about the nature and strength of the criterion 
and/or process we use to assess beliefs in the domain (what some epistemologists call 
“warrant”). Although Kant deals with the more familiar topics in epistemology about 
opinion, knowledge and belief in the end of the Critique, in the third section of the “Can-
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PSR, unification adds an extra step of reflection about the sort of reason we seek 
and the sort of object domain in which such a reason can explain.12 Domain 
specification allows for specific claims to be tested in their appropriate domain, 
but also most importantly it allows kinds of claims about objects in a domain to 
be tested in light of the epistemic standard expected and achievable within the 
domain. This very general account leaves a lot of questions, such as how are 
unifiers for domains chosen, how are epistemic standards set, whether they are 
revisable, and so on. I will deal with these larger issues by engaging first with a 
much narrower application of unification in the domain of science, both to add 
some detail about the attractions of unification and create a foil for the distinc-
tive features of the Kantian variety.  
Kant famously describes science as a “a whole of cognition ordered accord-
ing to principles” (Kant 2004: 14). This claim anticipates twentieth century ar-
guments in favour of unification presented by Michael Friedman, and subse-
quently, in a more programmatic fashion, by Philip Kitcher.13 Friedman sought 
to recover a non-psychological conception of understanding that tells us what is 
of value in scientific explanation, namely that it “reduces multiplicity of unex-
plained, independent phenomena to one” (Friedman 1974: 15). This unification 
“increases our understanding of the world by reducing the total number of phe-
nomena that we have to accept as ultimate or given” (ibid.).14 Kitcher (1989) ar-
gues that unification can replace available models of explanation, because it re-
duces fundamental incomprehensibilities and by showing how explanations are 
parts of sets, it allows connections to be made across regions of the set. So unifi-
cation encompasses gains we ordinarily value in scientific enquiry: it is genera-
tive—“can be used in the derivation of a large numbers of sentences which we 	
on of Pure Reason” (A 820/B 848- A 831-B 859) and extensively in his Lectures on Logic. 
So throughout this section “epistemic” will be a reference to the set of issues just speci-
fied and not the relation of belief and knowledge or knowledge and truth, although lim-
ited mention of these latter topics will become relevant while treating the “epistemic” is-
sues just specified. It is also the case that epistemic issues of that sort have a semantic 
dimension. 
12 The claim rests on the assumption, which I also attribute to Kant, is that explanation is 
not the only task reasons fulfill, they also justify, make plausible, make mandatory, make 
possible, make good until further notice and so on. 
13 Friedman (1974: 8) and Kitcher (1981: 508) trace antecedents in classical work n ex-
planation; that they are also both extensively engaged in Kant scholarship is perhaps not 
unrelated to their sensitivity to the value of unification. But just a Kantian look at the 
classical nomological account of explanation would find the latter fatally incomplete. 
Briefly DN starts from the basic description of scientific tasks as finding answers for 
“why?” questions that arise about the “phenomena in the world of our experience” 
(Hempel and Oppenheim 1948: 136), these answers take the form of the discovery—or 
formulation—of law-like generalisations, which function as major premises in arguments 
that particular phenomena to count as instances of the law. What is perplexing, from a 
Kantian perspective, is the assumption that there is a link between major and minor 
premise. Absent support from a realist conception of a creative divine will, to which 
Kant’s rationalist predecessors were able to appeal, law-like generalisations are mere uni-
fication devices for a range of different phenomena.  
14 Interestingly, the unifiers that permit this overall reduction of what we accept as brute, 
need not be intelligible, they render things familiar but may in themselves be “strange” or 
“unfamiliar”; since what matters are the relations of intelligibility they make possible 
within and across sets of phenomena. 
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accept” (1981: 514) and economical, because uses “few patters of arguments” 
and hence minimizes “the number of types of premises we must take as un-
derived” (1981: 529).15 
Critics argue that unificationist accounts promulgate a long defunct ideal of 
systematicity. Nancy Cartwright, for example, argues that the expectation that 
our knowledge of the world can be held together in one unified whole is dubi-
ous; a more fruitful approach that is also truer to actual scientific practice is to 
embrace local unities (Cartwright 1983: 3-4, and 2000). Accepting the proposal, 
renders the use of “world” somewhat forced, since all we may speak of is the re-
gions to which our concepts are addressed or perhaps temporal stretches during 
which our concepts hold. The challenge is explicitly anti-realist and anti-
foundationalist. Shorn of the ambition to have non-discursive content as its ob-
ject, unification continues to play a useful role directed to cognitive practices, by 
alerting us to look at what holds together the community of enquirers, such as, 
shared methodology, sets of interests and so on.16  
Two important points emerge from this anti-unificationist challenge. First, 
and irrespective of how contemporary unificationists defend their positions, 
Kant seems vulnerable to the criticism that he is simply in the grip of an obsolete 
model.17 However, as I will argue shortly, this picture is back to front: it is the 
need for testing that drives Kant’s unificationist proposal, not some residual at-
tachment to systematicity.  
Second, the anti-unificationist arguments cast light in the incipient antireal-
ism of contemporary unificationism. It is telling, for example, that, in another 
paper, Friedman (1997) vindicates a role of philosophy in science as mediator 
between Carnapian external questions; philosophy provides the concepts that 
enable communication among different linguistic frameworks, and while these 
concepts and the theories to which they belong may be transitory and herme-	
15 “Science uses the same patterns of derivation again and again for different phenomena 
and in doing so it shows us how to reduce the types of facts we accept as ultimate or 
brute” (Kitcher 1986: 504). There are both more recent versions of unificationism and 
some parallels I left unexplored between epistemic and metaphysical aspects of reduc-
tion: the ability to place a maximum number of diverse phenomena under a small num-
ber that are accepted as brute lends itself to questions about ontological basicness and hi-
erarchy, which are important but not relevant to my argument. 
16 I run together here different projects: Catherine Elgin 1996 and Helen Longino 1998— 
though they are much closer in their focus on interest than Longino 2001 which empha-
sises shared method. Elgin develops a Goodmanian argument in favour of a sort of unity 
that is the system in reflective equilibrium, i.e. a system that is maximally tenable and 
this is a “worthy epistemic goal” (1996: 99) because it is rationally cohesive (“the ele-
ments are reasonable in light of one another”, ibid.) and the whole is “reasonable in light 
of the objectives we originally espoused” (ibid.). Systems in reflective equilibrium “are 
tethered not to Things in themselves but to our antecedent understanding of and interest 
in the matters at hand” (1996: 107). Longino 1998 argues for theoretical pluralism and 
against monist unification, which aims at the resolution of dissension (1998: 197), the lo-
cal unities she allows reflect dominant theoretical interests at particular times (1998: 230-
31). Longino 2001 allows for unity of community of researchers with shared standards 
and methods of evaluation (2001:148) but remains agnostic about whether their findings 
form a whole or present as a plurality of non-congruent accounts (2001: 140). 
17 Kant often contrasts “system” and mere “aggregate” (A835/B863) and describes his 
thought as an architectonic whole, which he then defines this as “the art of systems”, 
where “system” is “the unity of the manifold cognitions under one idea” (A832/B860). 
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neutically mutable, they occupy that external space intelligibly.18 Philosophy 
can treat belief revision in the same way as it can revolution in belief systems, by 
supplying the tools for classifying them as instances of conceptual transfor-
mation, rather than of mere reaction to facts (Friedman 1997: 19). Rational re-
covery of what can seem arbitrary or merely opaque is essential to securing 
philosophically another naturalist commitment, which we have not discussed so 
far, and which comes from Quine’s conception of the totality of human 
knowledge as a vast interconnecting nexus of beliefs from which no belief is 
immune to revision (Friedman 1997: 7). By incipient antirealism I mean that the 
defense of the rationality of belief revision and theory choice, more generally, of 
scientific rationality depends on positing a convergence over time of the differ-
ent unifying frameworks and so this is an internal process of adjustment not con-
vergence to an “entirely independent reality”; all epistemic and semantic claims 
are framework relative (Friedman 2001: 118). If Kant’s unificationism took this 
form, then it would not be suited to the first order continuity task, which is, pro-
grammatically at least, to defend realism. 
Although Kant has his own versions of the advantages of unification, espe-
cially in passages where he defends the importance of a systematic unity in cog-
nition (e.g. A 645/B673), and applications to other domains of rational thought, 
what he sees and its contemporary defenders do not, is its testing function; its 
promise as a solution to the second order problem of testing of philosophical 
claims. 
Unification is achieved by a set of rules that set out the object domain for 
the proper conduct of the enquiry. The rules can be derived from concepts 
which function to unify the domain, e.g. “objects of experience”. As the rules 
become clear through analysis and argument, the epistemic expectations appro-
priate to the domain settle. Unification is not a minimalist achievement, since 
no unifier is self-explanatory and most rules have contrastive applications in 
other object-domains. Nonetheless having the full theoretical goal in view is not 
needed for testing: since in most cases philosophical claims fall short because 
they ignore one or more of the rules that set out the object domain of the en-
quiry. Testing allows for the systematic demarcation of domains to which philo-
sophical claims can be made and the epistemic force they can carry.  
The testing procedure is more vividly illustrated in the negative part of the 
Critique. Rationalist metaphysics seek to provide secure foundation for natural 
sciences by way of unshakeable propositions about metaphysical facts. Kant’s 
diagnosis in the antinomy is that such facts do not appear to constrain in any 
way the claims made about them (this is a general thesis following from the Co-
pernican Revolution). The solution is to demarcate the kinds of things that can 
be said about the objects that belong to the domain. The reflective failure Kant 
calls “dogmatism” can be remedied through a systematic programme of reflec-
tion on what it takes to predicate anything of anything, ranging from the most 
ordinary objects of daily experience, to the most extraordinary ones (e.g. God). 
Different rules establish different sets of kinds of objects by establishing, through 
critical argument, the kinds of things that can be said about the objects. The de-	
18 The role of philosophy I attribute to Friedman here is highly reminiscent of the media-
tive role Longino 1998 envisages between concurrent localities that are not congruent but 
also the unification model defended by Gemes 1994 who champions a model of unifica-
tion that aims at reconciling incompatible claims. 
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marcation rules or concepts set out the epistemic aims that are permissible with-
in each domain but also the best in epistemic terms that is achievable, namely 
objective judgements about objects in the domain.19  
The idea that different rules establish different domains of thought about 
objects needs further qualification if we are to avoid ending up with a Kantian 
mosaic. At the same time, if rational demarcation is a priori in the sense of un-
revisable, the model is implausibly conservative. The full account, which also 
shows what is distinctive about Kantian unification requires the following three 
crucial qualifications:  
(1) The unification of the domain of possible objects of experience holds a spe-
cial role in the project, since it offers us both conditions of objective judgements 
about such objects but also conditions of reference, and empirical cognition. 
Although it has all the general characteristics of unification as testing given 
above, it is also set apart. Terminologically, Kant marks it out by calling the uni-
fying concepts that serve within the domain, constitutive of the domain. The spe-
cial role of this unification is justified, because empirical cognition is of a certain 
standard, which other putative objects of thought lack. Although this lack has 
implications about what can be said about such objects, the positive task of re-
flection and boundary setting continues with the identification of domains in 
which these objects can have a role though what Kant calls regulative ideas. 
(2) Regulative concepts or ideas are fascinating because of the great diversity of 
unifying domains and epistemic tasks they help define. Some regulative con-
cepts are functionally purposeful for the conduct of a specific enquiry; “funda-
mental power” (A 649/B677) is recommended as one such example. Such ab-
stracta help unify specific scientific programmes, by making present—providing 
a focal point—an item such as “fundamental power” that helps relate empirical 
findings across the research domain. The fact that fundamental power is not 
subject to cognitive constraints, and so not a cognition, means that the domain 
it unifies, while it contains cognitions—claims about specific powers—comes 
with different epistemic expectations about the warrant of its claims; which is 
simply to say it is a complex theoretical domain not a set of individually verifia-
ble empirical statements. Other regulative ideas have a wider unifying remit, 
“world” for example define a domain in which sets of laws apply securing uni-
formity in their application under the limited warrant of the set unified by 
“world”. The testing element consists in accepting that we have no justifica-
tion—and none is plausibly forthcoming—for thinking that inductive rules ap-
ply. 	
19 In the Anglo-American reception of Kant’s thought there is a strong tradition of inter-
pretation focusing on his epistemology, possibly under the influence of interpretative 
choices by Kemp Smith (see Hanna 2006: 6) but most obviously in the so-called epistem-
ic interpretation of appearances and things in themselves most influentially perhaps de-
fended in Allison 2004 (a revision of the 1983 volume; but see Stang 2018 for a fuller ac-
count). What I aim to show is that epistemic concerns, such as the conditions of objectiv-
ity, epistemic warrant, and both in a priori specified domains and a posteriori ones 
(which admittedly Kant does not explicitly tackle except perhaps in the Anthropology) are 
an important part of the critical theoretical project but they are sandwiched so to speak 
between a foundational layer that aims to establish realism and an upper layer that di-
rects us through a kind of absolute objectivity that is not theoretically available. 
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Regulative ideas define domains of enquiry and “regulate” the epistemic 
expectations appropriate for the domain; they establish the degrees of objectivity 
appropriate for the claims made in the domain. Although Kant treats scientific 
enquiries briefly here, it seems that the more mature the enquiry, the more 
populated the domain, the more established the rules employed within it, and so 
the more “unified” it is. So the greater degree of unification within a domain 
goes with the collective achievement of objectivity within the domain (“collec-
tive” because it is not a matter of a single rule or insight; this view is very close 
to modern unificationism and even accommodates some of their critics). The 
testing role of unification with the use of regulative ideas comes from rejection, 
not just of specific metaphysical theses purporting to communicate facts, but al-
so, an implication of this traditional and orthodox interpretation of the Critique’s 
destructive power is the rejection of rational or divine guarantees about the ne-
cessity of some domains and its contents, and, more positively and less widely 
recognized, the possibility of a renewal of metaphysics (across the board). What 
creates critical friction and tests the regulatively unified domains is that regula-
tive ideas are modally fragile and so conceivably revisable, which means that 
some may be found to have exhaust their value, if, for example, a claim of a 
kind that is permissible within the domain creates impermissible conclusions 
down the line.20  
(3) Testing by unification is a systematic process of critical reflection, that is 
suited to the task because it works by engaging with the philosophical claims 
about objects in order to identify what can be said about such objects. When we 
move from constitutive to regulative it is not clear how to understand Kant’s re-
peated claims that there is a need for unity emanating from reason itself (e.g. 
A302/B359). One way to look at this is that there must be a further conception 
of unification that can guide our efforts at organised rational thought and be 
testing of such efforts as a whole. So far, all unifiers, constitutive and regulative, 
come with conditions for their application and domain restrictions. The ques-
tion is whether a unifier that is free of such limits is conceivable. Kant uses re-
peatedly a term that specifies what holds objectively without qualification, “the 
unconditioned” (see B xx-xxi, and esp. A 322-323)—or “absolute” (A 324-6)—
but only to chastise reason for seeking to know it. So PSR, which would be the 
obvious candidate, is already rejected once we take the path of testing by do-
main demarcation. While Kant withdraws from us the prospect of a theory of all 
theories, he opens up the possibility of critical reflection about the aims of ra-
tionally organised thought and the goals we set in undertaking such thought 	
20 I do not have the space to develop my account of regulative ideas and the unities they 
make possible in dialogue with existing commentary. With the possible exception of Paul 
Guyer who connects with unity with the idea of systematic happiness (Guyer 2001: 94), 
most interpreters give variations of the epistemic interpretation I offer here, though not 
all agree about the success of Kant’s argumentative strategy (Guyer 1997: 42). Philip 
Kitcher discusses the unificatory role of regulative ideas, as I do here, but also their func-
tion as meta-rules for the application of the categories, which implicates them in the con-
stitution of experience, in ways that are deeply problematic as I explain below. Hannah 
Ginsborg (2017) incorporates regulative ideas and systematicity in an entirely original 
reading about the conditions of nature as an object of human judgement. My interpreta-
tive aim is to show the possibility of aligning narrow and broad cognitive aims (see Mas-
simi 2017) while allowing a non-reductive architectonic between the resulting unities (see 
Gava 2014).  
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through what he calls a “cosmopolitan” idea, which relates “all cognition to the 
essential ends of human reason (teleologia rationis humanae)” (A838-39/B866-67). 
The rule that gives these ends is objective in the requisite sense, i.e. uncondi-
tional, because it is the ought contained in the moral law, which specifies the 
practical ends of reason (A832/B860). 
What I tried to show in this section is (a) that unification is a procedure for 
testing theoretical claims in general and philosophical claims in particular; (b) 
that it allows for maximal reflection and reflexivity about a range of specific sci-
entific enquiries, and as a result, it admits of degrees; (c) because the different 
regulative unifying projects can be more or less mature, the model fits the more 
theoretically developed contemporary unificationist projects; (d) unification in-
corporates reflection on the broader aims of the unifying project itself, which in-
troduces topic-transcendent axiological concerns, about what enquirers should 
have in view as objective guiding standard, and ultimately about their moral 
practical identities and the nature of essential human ends; (e) finally, and this 
leads to the topic of the next section, although domain specification is key to 
unification and the task of testing, the whole edifice is anchored on a conception 
of experience that sustains empirical realism. 
 
2.2. Realism and Unity 
The concepts that unify the domain of possible objects of experience set a high 
standard of objectivity because of their modal force and scope.21 They are testing 
because they function as rules determining a priori what is possible to say about 
such objects; so classes of claims that fall foul of these rules are ipso facto philo-
sophically adrift. In addition, because they are constitutive, that is, they spell out 
all the necessary conditions of “one universal experience” (A 110), when they 
fail to obtain, there are no objects of experience (which is not to say there may 
not be perceptions).22 By implication, if something meets these rules of unity 
(A302/B359), it cannot fail to be an object of experience, that is, no additional 
anti-sceptical arguments are needed to exclude putative simulacra (see A 
493/B21). The epistemic status of constitutive concepts clearly surpasses that of 
regulative ones. Nonetheless, there is no hiding that qua unifiers constitutive 
and regulative concepts perform the same role: they define the appropriate epis-
temic expectations for a domain of objects, the domain that is appropriately uni-
fied by the said concepts. And they do so after careful critical argument, that is, 
as part of the process of philosophical thought’s self-testing. Crudely: they earn 
their status and have their role defined by pure reason.  
If, as I claimed at the outset, continuity with science, on the idealist natu-
ralist view, requires the defence of realism, it is not clear how the fruits of this 
essentially internal exercise in reflection and mapping can be of help. In what 
follows, I will identify a distinctive feature in the unification of the domain of 
objects of experience, which, allows for a very different style of thought to 	
21 For excellent treatment of this topic see Ameriks 2017.  
22 The parenthetical remark aims to draw attention to the distinction between percep-
tions, which are subjective, objective perceptions, which are “cognitions” and so, given 
their conformity a priori to the constitutive rules of the domain for objects of experience, 
can become items of knowledge that is objective and of objects; this is the basic claim. 
For discussion of “cognition” see Willaschek and Watkins 2017. 
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emerge alongside its paradigmatic execution of the epistemic tasks of unifica-
tionism—indeed unification of the domain of objects of experience functions 
like the steel core in the construction of the theoretical system.  
Let us start with considering how constitutive concepts fulfil their epistem-
ic, i.e. domain-defining, functions and how they differ from regulative ones. 
Consider a regulative concept, “world”.23 When Kant shows that the examina-
tion of deductive arguments purporting to state facts about the object thought 
through this concept, and so to enrich our concept, fails, the critical reader 
learns that the thought about the object does not constrain one way or another 
what can be said about it. This discovery affects the concept’s unifying function 
for the domain of natural laws, the expectation of uniformity is a concessive rule 
for scientific research. Consider now a constitutive concept, “substance”. When 
Kant sets out the conditions of its use, he does not examine what facts about the 
concept can help establish its credentials (this comes much later in his examina-
tion of common misuses of the concept). Constitutive concepts or categories are 
picked up from the table of the most general forms of thought, forms that have 
general organisational functions and no remit to regulate content (see B 166-67). 
In order to become constitutive of the domain of the objects of experience, their 
use must be constrained, and it must be constrained not ad hoc but in accord-
ance with a rule; the constraint that applies as an unexceptional rule is the for-
mal features of the objects of the relevant domain, in short, their spatial and tem-
poral form.24 Space and time are the necessary a priori conditions of all outer 
and inner experience, they are pure forms of sensibility (e.g. B 66, A 49). These 
forms set the basic epistemic rules for the domain by directing the use of the 
concepts that have a claim to constitute the domain (a claim that gets its main 
defence in the transcendental deduction). Forms of thought about objects of 
possible experience bear a special relation to the form of their possible objects 
before even the task of vindicating their applicability to such objects is undertak-
en. This distinctive feature of unification at this level allows Kant to pursue side 
by side an epistemic unifying project, which I will outline briefly below, and a 
project about reference that sustains empirical realism. 
First though, some questions about method are in order. Kant has plenty to 
say about the conscious representation of objects of experience, or “objective 
perceptions” (A 320/ B 376-77). Why does he avoid talking about the objects of 
these representational states as intentional, referring and so on, and insists on 
their dependence on an internal relation of unification in a judgement (e.g. A 
79, B 105)?25 The unity of judgement is just the application of the basic unifying 
rule for the domain just spelt out, it is a unity of a priori sensible and discursive 
forms through which alone, as will be shown in the transcendental deduction, 
objects of experience can be thought. Note: there is no additional argument 	
23 Throughout, I use “concept” to mean thought, concepts in the tradition I consider here 
are not the same as words, though the distinction is not systematically discussed. But the 
deep issue that is at stake and becomes especially urgent for Hegel is about thought and 
things and about the form of thought that is about things.  
24 Kant announces this already in B73, which constrains judgments to spatio-temporal 
objects, before even tackling transcendental logic.  
25 The question does not depend on an intentionalist interpretation of judgement, such as 
proposed by Aquila 1983, it raises a conceptual issue, the importance of which is recog-
nised by Kant (see A 320/B376; A 491/B 519. 
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about what it takes for such thoughts to be about objects of experience; does 
Kant think there are no general conditions of reference? Or is this a secondary 
concern?  
To understand his method, I think it is important to have in view Kant’s 
possible interlocutors. The task of specifying the domain of objects of experience 
is undertaken in response to a piece of philosophical inheritance Kant considers 
a dead-end. To the untutored mind, the experience of objects in one’s surround-
ing environment seems plausibly described as a relation the experiencing subject 
has with some of those objects; for Kant, the basic realism of this thought is 
something to be preserved. The philosophical inheritance he wants to undo de-
scribes this same relation as a self-relation, because what is given to the subject 
is, on reflection, some idea or impression, in short, mental content. The experi-
encing subject has direct access to its mental content; it has no direct access to 
the worldly objects the content is—presumably—about and is in weak epistemic 
position with respect to these objects. One of Kant’s innovations is to separate 
epistemic objectivity from reference to real objects, yet address both topics with 
the same tools. Here is the problem he inherits: the experiencing subject can get 
a criterion for objectivity from the inside, by scanning mental contents to identi-
fy qualitative differences. Alighting on features such as clarity or luminosity, 
which only some mental items possess, proponents of this method claim success 
in identifying what is suitable for inclusion as basic components in a system of 
knowledge and candidates for sound premises in an inference that secures refer-
ence to extra-mental reality. In recognition of the fragility of their position, they 
grant a supernatural being the role of mediator or guarantor for the validity of 
such inferences. 
If we see Kant as responding to this piece of philosophical inheritance, the 
first task is to show that some a priori concepts unify unexceptionally—and 
without need of further anti-sceptical argument—the domain of objects of expe-
rience. Domain specification is part of an argument that aims to show that an a 
priori and systematic distinction between “subjective” and “objective” is attain-
able.26 This argument is given in the deduction: instead of the epistemic subject 
being engaged in the empirical task of scanning mental contents, it gets the a 
priori role of unifier of the domain of objects to which concepts apply, and so as 
the subject of the judgement we mentioned earlier, it is part of the solution to 
the epistemic problem.27  
Still the problem of reference remains and is perhaps even more urgent giv-
en Kant's entirely a priori answer to the question of what is a possible object of 
experience. The deduction, and indeed the discussion that follows in subsequent 
sections about the validity of constitutive concepts, assumes the truth of the 	
26 Note that at this stage, subjective is good enough to stand from what is mind-
dependent, dreams, illusions, but also biases indoctrinations, epistemic egoism as Kant 
puts in it the Anthropology need additional analysis because they are more complex 
problems (“the idea of a public use of reason” is part of the response). 
27 Strawson folds objective validity and objective reference in stating that the requirement 
can be satisfied by distinguishing “awareness of objects […] from experiences of them” 
(Strawson 1966: 24). The source of the problem is the strong anti-sceptical aims Strawson 
attributes to the argument, for which a thin notion of experience as mere sensory input is 
acceptable; this leads to a strong transcendental argument of the form [necessarily (a, b)]. 
Unfortunately the overall strategy leads to irrealism, which is incompatible with Kant’s 
aims. 
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basic premise of the deduction, which is that a manifold is given to us through 
the senses.28 But what is given through the senses is not transparently clear. If it 
is mental content, as per Kant’s predecessors, then the problem of reference is 
how we can relate it in a principled and systematic way to the objects of experi-
ence that causally affect the subject.29 The epistemic account gives us the form of 
thought for any putatively objectively referring representations, what is missing 
is an explanation of how such representations put us in contact with their ob-
jects; correct epistemic form needs supplementation with an account that cap-
tures even minimally genuine reference.  
All we have is assurance of something given throughout senses (which the 
epistemic criteria presumably will allow us to distinguish from illusions or 
dream). The given are “representations of the senses” (A 2; see also B1), the 
contact that pre-philosophically secures reference is through the senses, and 
Kant give is a philosophical role as the purely sensible content of the representa-
tion (see B 129; also earlier B 127). The discussion can get side-tracked at this 
stage back to epistemic issues about primary and secondary qualities and rela-
tional or other knowledge we may have of objects given to us through our sens-
es. But this is not the issue here: it is rather more generally “representation” it-
self, which while it has a priori form, Kant states, it does not “produce its object 
as far as its existence is concerned” (B 125, A 93). The question is what within 
the theory sustains this independence claim, while at the same time securing 
some contact with the object in terms of such existential independence (other-
wise we can have a theory of reference that is too generous and includes even 
hallucinated objects). The answer, I will argue, is contained in the distinctive 
feature of unification of objects of experience.  
The form of thought for any putatively objectively referring representations, 
and so judgements about objects of experience, comes down to a rule for correct 
use of the copula “is” (B 141) or a rule of the “is” of predication in the relevant 
domain: the use of a priori concepts is restricted through a priori forms of sensi-
bility. Shadowing the “is” of predication is a rule for the “is” of existence for ob-
jects of experience: that they have spatial and temporal properties, necessarily. 
The contact we sought is thus established through the existential interpretation 
of the “is” of predication. This is to say simply that the spatially and temporally 
modulated “is” of existence captures the most basic features of empirical object 
awareness, namely that something is there, now, or that it was there for a period 
of time in the past, or that it is now further away, or that it was here and that 
now it is are no more. Note that the ideality of space and time does not affect 
their role as realist reference markers, since the reference we seek to secure is to 	
28 We know this from the Aesthetic: “The capacity for receiving representation through 
the mode in which we are affected by objects is entitled sensibility. Objects are given to 
us by means of sensibility” (A 19, B 33). There is a causal account that describes the 
“how?” of this relation (see the quote above and A 86, B 118; B 125), but there is out-
standing a philosophical account of the general nature of this relation. Ameriks’s regres-
sive approach helps highlight this and makes space for the realist interpretation I offer; 
Ameriks allows a thick notion of experience as truth-evaluable and transcendentally ex-
aminable in the form of (a, necessarily b).  
29 The causal relation, while true (read A 19, B 33; A 86, B 118; B 125 and of course 
plays a role in the “Refutation of Idealism”), is not for Kant the way to deal with either 
the epistemic (which are ultimately quid juris?) or the metaphysical questions posed by 
objects of experience. 
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objects of experience which are objects of possible experience.30 Time and space 
as realist reference markers align with the untutored belief that our senses put us 
in contact with objects of experience; that we do not infer them, we are in con-
tact with them. The epistemic and referential “is” work together to give us the a 
priori conditions to sort out basic first-hand mistakes of experience, provided of 
course there is some empirical judgment made about the experience. 
The advantage of this minimalist realism is that it does not commit to a dis-
cussion of the referential properties of empirical representations and what truth-
conditions they have. This is a tricky question in any context, but especially in 
the Kantian in which any obvious option (e.g. isomorphism) would be beyond 
our capacity to know it (because of our ignorance of things as they are in them-
selves) and this limitation has traditionally thought to count against realism. 
Still, something more ought to be said about the content of empirical representa-
tions because if, as some quotes suggest, this is just the “raw material” awaiting 
conceptual form, then the objects we encounter will be just spatio-temporal cy-
phers.31  
I will conclude by following a hint given in the claim that empirical represen-
tations are cognitions.32 Cognitions are typically representations that are in the form 
of judgements, so they are conceptualised content. What is philosophically inter-
esting, however, is that “cognition” stands also for the availability of sensory cogni-
tive content. The topic of availability is of interest because it asks us to think how 
such content is about objects. The issue is delicate because the “about” lies be-
tween the causal story of our connection to the world (and the proper functioning 
of the causal channels that are our senses) and the general terms we use to refer to 
it when we do, that is, the words we use and which allow us to do this not because 
they are magically connected to the objects they name.  
Here is a suggestion for filling that in between space: the senses are causally 
involved but it is for a task: they are our species-specific information reception 	
30 “Possible experience” is the referential equivalent of the epistemic “possible objects of 
experience”. The role I give the existential copula is compatible with Kant’s denial that 
being is not a real predicate (A 598/ B 626); the existential “is” adds indeed nothing to 
the concept of the object.  
31 Regarding empirical content see: “the impressions of the senses supplying the first 
stimulus” (A 86, B 118), Kant also speaks of impressions in the A and B Introductions he 
talks about the “raw material of sensible impressions”. One strong motivation for recent 
non-conceptualist readings of Kant is the loss of the heterogeneity thesis that is at the 
heart of his theory; see Allais 2004. However, note that an unexpected advantage of for-
mal referring criteria is that Kant can deal with exotic “experiences”, the temporal and 
measurable values called “observables” in modern physics which do not inhere on a sub-
stance as classical and indeed epistemically well-attributed Kantian properties do.  
32 By “beings like” us I mean to refer only to our kind of perceptive powers and function-
ing; it seems obvious that it is a general phenomenon of an animal’s sensory capacities 
putting it in touch with their surrounding environment. But beyond this natural phenom-
enon that is the province of science, as Gaskin 2006 argues, there is for human experi-
encers the problem of reference and the genuineness of their sensory input. Though I take 
a rather speculative path in developing this point, there is a line of commentary that aims 
at similar defenses of realism, which are both detailed and scholarly, see Allais 2004 and 
Westphal 2006. My own aim or rather hunch in following this path is that if we allow par-
ticulars in the Kantian account, these cannot be just spatio-temporally identifiable, and 
then if we make them instantiations of properties in judgements we have lost them as 
particulars. 
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system, more simply: they are how beings like us learn first-hand about their en-
vironment.33 The looks, sounds, feels of things, the manifold of qualitatively var-
ied sensory content is just information about our environment, which once re-
ceived, needs classification, identification, retrieval and so on, in order to be 
recognizable as a “message”—in order to be learning—we pick from our envi-
ronment; so this first hand awareness of information-rich world, or, more radi-
cally our being in information rich states just by virtue of being in information-
rich environments, requires reduction into a manifold so that we can put sense 
to judgement, to epistemically evaluable units.34 The point of this—admittedly 
sketchy—fuller realist picture is that we depend for information on receptivity 
and on the channels that convey it and this is the case for sensory content as it is 
for email content and so on; and of course the picture is realist while allowing 
that something counts as information if some receptor gets it.  
Acceptance of this last speculative suggestion does not affect the overall ar-
gument that unification of the objects of experience can fulfil both testing and 
continuity tasks, all thanks to the dual role of the a priori forms of sensibility, 
which restrict the use of a priori concepts, while identifying the necessary prop-
erties that existing objects of experience possess, thereby securing reference for 
scientific empirical statements.  
 
3. From Kant to Hegel 
I hope that the previous two sections have done enough to show how the ideal-
ist naturalism I attributed to Kant has at its disposal sophisticated tools to ad-
dress both the testing and the continuity tasks that it shares with some contem-
porary naturalist programmes in philosophy. Having Kant’s project in view is 
indispensable for understanding Hegel’s starting point about what is philosophi-
cally possible, his identification of what is necessary, the so-called “comple-
tion”, and his expectation of what is achievable.35  
A contextual clarification is perhaps in order here. Already in my use of the 
term “idealist naturalist”, I distance myself from two prominent lines of inter-	
33 The novel term is “information”, which I borrow an early formal account of transmis-
sion/reception (Shannon [1993 [1943]: 7). Formalism is an advantage because it allows us 
to consider empirical content as having a role, a cognitive one in fact, without the need to 
enter into the conceptualism/non-conceptualism controversy. In information theory, it is 
acknowledged that the word is not context invariant, but rather it changes according to 
fields in which it proves useful (Shannon 1993:180). This too is attractive because it fits the 
dynamism and variety of our sensory systems. Generally, it is accepted that “information” 
can also have a number of physical or material realisations (see Drestke 1981 for an attempt 
to offer a semantic account). All this goes against the most famous perhaps philosophical 
appreciation of information theory by Daniel Dennett (2017) who sees it as supporting the 
exact reverse view of senses I presented here (Dennett 1988). The speculative piece with 
which I conclude this section is an invitation I read in Kant’s argument about empirical rep-
resentations to let go another piece of philosophical inheritance in which the senses are just 
a maddening philosophical problem about qualia. 
34 I keep deliberately underdetermined these tasks because my proposal can co-exist with 
both non-conceptualist and some conceptualist interpretation; the issue being of course 
the nature of the manifold of these received contents (for passages suggesting its depend-
ence on concepts see A 77, B 102-103; A 105; B129; for passages that do not see A 116).  
35 The original source of the term “completion” is Hegel’s letter to Schelling dated April 16, 
1795 (Butler and Seiler 1984: 35). 
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pretation. One, now relatively obsolete, interprets Kant as honorary positivist, 
who asks that our knowledge claims be restricted to empirical facts. The other, 
still current, interprets the move from Kant to Hegel in terms of the progressive 
emancipation of philosophy from the vestiges of rationalist metaphysics, in fa-
vour of naturalism, understood now broadly, as a programme for re-orienting 
philosophy, by specifying a domain of philosophical enquiry and the type of an-
swers that are acceptable. While seeds for each interpretation can be found in 
the relevant texts; they risk recreating, in historical garb, a vexatious twentieth 
century choice between the rock of a naturalistic vocabulary that can appear too 
restrictive and distorting (Stroud 1996: 48) and the hard place of “expansive” 
and “open-minded” naturalism, which reduces to mere attitude of “open-
mindedness” (Stroud 1996: 54).36  
On my reading, Hegel shares Kant’s concern with the autonomy of philos-
ophy and its relation to the natural sciences. He seeks to justify its authority and 
its claim to autonomy, by showing how it can successfully perform the testing 
and continuity tasks, which he also sees as vital in properly conceptualising the 
relation of philosophy to the natural sciences. Despite the element of “comple-
tion”, which I shall soon explain, Hegel’s idealist naturalism is no more nor less 
“idealist” and no more nor “naturalist” than Kant’s.  
Anticipating somewhat, I will argue that Hegel’s need for completion is 
presented first in terms of resolving a problem with unification and testing he 
identifies in Kant. At the same time, once this problem is resolved, it gives a dif-
ferent shape to the continuity task, the aim remains the philosophical provision 
of a realistic account of the relation of thought and nature that does not require 
supernatural appeal (to a divine epistemic guarantor for example). The term 
“realism” tends to be too broad, so to narrow down its Hegelian sense is the 
search for a position in which items do not admit of further interpretations, con-
ceptual schemes or what have you, they acquire a certain stability, how this is 
achieved is through the idea that thought is capable of specifying particularity, 
perfectly and without any remainder. “Completion” then has both the sense of 
this positive claim about thought—thought itself accomplishes itself, so to 
speak—and the more traditional, relational sense of engagement in deep and 
critical dialogue with Kant. 
 
3.1. Hegel: Unification as Self-Knowledge 
Hegel’s commitment to the systematicity of thought is not only explained by the 
solution unification offers to the problem of testing philosophical claims. Testing 
remains, nonetheless, a central motivation both to expanded and systematically 
interlocked unification project he undertakes and to the dialectical logic that 
binds the whole together.37 The sense of “completion” that is relevant to this 
section is the relational one, because the need for completion arises from the 	
36 For a defence of resolute naturalism, see Rosenberg 2011; expansive naturalism is de-
fended in McDowell 1994. 
37 For an excellent account of the commitment to systematicity see Sandkaulen 2017. On 
dialectic see Winfield 1990. At the same time there is considerable overlap in aims with 
the epistemic function of unification in Kant and the range of projects to which this is 
relevant. For an indication of the range of these projects, empirical and philosophical see 
EL §12: 16-18, and also the ideas of “unity” and “system” in EL §14 and §15. The points 
are repeated again in EN §250 and Remark. 
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identification of a problem with constitutive unification. Specifically, Hegel ar-
gues that at the constitutive level, unification fails, because the definition of the 
object domain is incomplete, the domain is disunified. The problem is that 
alongside the positive account of experience Kant gives, he allows for an “other 
world”—the “negative of every image”, the “Thing-in-itself” (EL §44: 72). The 
thesis about our ignorance of things as they are in themselves leads to suspicion 
of the credentials of the categories as objective forms; they are, Hegel says, 
“merely our thoughts, and separated from the thing as it is in itself by an insur-
mountable gulf” (EL §50: 83).38 The problem, as Sally Sedgewick recently put it, 
is that “we have no grounds for supposing that [the subjective form of experi-
ence] reveals the reality of the given sense content itself” (Sedgwick 2012: 136).  
To say that things as they are in themselves are a problem for testing and 
ultimately for philosophical autonomy sounds like an odd diagnosis of Hegel’s 
criticism, since, as Sedgwick puts it, it is the reality of the objects of empirical 
representations that is threatened by a competing thing with a claim to being re-
al. Note that if we go down this path, it is easy to fold epistemic and referential 
issues, since if what we thought was real is merely what we count as real, it is 
the “counting” that matters. To put it differently, our ability to make fine epis-
temic distinctions is not affected (indeed, historically this problem has been tak-
en as an opportunity to transform all questions into epistemic ones).39 I take a 
different view of the criticism.  
To make the problem Hegel identifies perspicuous let us start by drawing a 
parallel between what we may call the positive and the negative application of 
the criterion of conformity to the a priori conditions of human sensibility, space 
and time. Earlier we saw that the a priori forms of sensibility have an epistemic 
role in restraining the application of a priori concepts to possible object of expe-
rience, thereby securing their proper use; they also have a role in establishing 
minimal realist reference for empirical representations. When it comes to things 
in themselves, we have an epistemic thesis about ignorance, the negation of the 
same criterion: we do not know things as they are in themselves because they 
are not things that appear in space and time. The negative application of the cri-
terion establishes a priori a case of ignorance but also, because this is the only 
known feature of the things in question, it yields an a priori criterion for onto-
logical commitment to these unknowns, which states that some things are real 
just in case they are in every respect independent of our cognitive abilities. The 
problem, which creates a need for “completion”, is the threat of metaphysical 
realism, a position that defines a domain exclusively through its transcending 
our unifying abilities, yet qua domain of it is unifiable, albeit a unifier with other 	
38 Sedgwick 2012 gives an exemplary analysis of the standard view of the Hegelian criti-
cism; see Houlgate 2016 and Stern 1999. The reading I attribute to Hegel, which aims to 
minimise the ontological commitments of the thesis without entirely suppressing them is 
inspired by an early suggestion by Ameriks concerning Kant’s ongoing reflections on his 
relation to traditional ontology (2003: 133). 
39 The ontological version of the criticism can be found in Hegel (e.g. EL §45: “the things 
immediately known are mere appearances—in other words, the ground of their being is 
not in themselves but in something else”) but not in order to explain the subjectivism 
charge, rather Hegel here criticises Kant for not following through to the “step of defin-
ing what this something else is” (ibid.). I think the thesis I attribute to Hegel in the fol-
lowing section can make sense of this claim; for an alternative view see Kreines 2007. 
Katerina Deligiorgi	
	
36 
abilities, e.g. a divine unifier.40 Even as a possibility, metaphysical realism is a 
threat because it unpicks all the hard work of the constitutive unification and 
undermines its results, namely that a systematic a priori relation between objec-
tive and subjective is possible and within human reach. For this reason, Hegel 
complains that we are left with merely our thoughts.  
It is worth noting that although Hegel’s criticism fits more naturally the so-
called two-world interpretation, it is applicable to the two-aspect interpretation, 
which states that we can only know things given certain conditions and that ab-
stracting from such conditions in the hope of identifying features of mind-
independent reality is a self-defeating enterprise. We may engage in such ab-
straction entirely legitimately, when we consider things not as putative objects of 
experience but as they are in themselves. From a Hegelian perspective, the claim 
that they are thinkable invites a question about the possibility of this thought. 
On the two-aspect interpretation, possibility is just the absence of contradiction 
in the thought of one thing under two different aspects. The truth of this possi-
bility is put at risk by the unknowability of one of the two aspects and a way to 
stabilise the position is to grant these thinkables ontological weight and bring 
metaphysical realism back in the picture. 
“Completion” is the removal of this threat through strengthening the epis-
temic gains of constitutive unification. In effect, Hegel’s systematic writings can 
be viewed as a heroic project of constitutive unification, which aims to show for 
a whole range of concepts how their application is relative to object domains 
and how, conversely, object domains as unified through appropriate forms of 
thought. For Hegel unification has to be ambitious in order to account for the 
diversity and range of human experience, but also systematic in order to resist 
the centripetal force of such diversity and range. For each object domain, e.g. 
nature or mind, which are the two on which I focus mainly here, unification will 
be internally differentiated through appropriate concepts and by the same means 
formative of a system. The aim is to achieve a unified whole or a “totality”, 
which, Hegel clearly acknowledges, is a philosophical demand: in “our ordinary 
thinking the world is grasped as an aggregate of finite experiences” (EN §247 
Zusatz, 16) but philosophy requires conceptual order to be established out of this 
aggregate. So, for example, “nature is to be regarded as a system of stages one aris-
ing necessarily from the other”, this is not “generated naturally”, it is a matter of 
the “idea” (EN §249: 20). Given the ambition of Hegelian unification, it seems 
hard to maintain that this project can contribute to testing philosophical claims, 
or, looking ahead, that it will have anything to contribute to the realist require-
ments of the continuity task. I will focus on testing here and take up the continu-
ity issue in the next section. 
Testing is integral to the unifying process. The test is whether some candi-
date concept is cognitively up to the task. The testing is entrusted to dialectic, 
now upgraded from mere logic of illusion, to thought’s own way of checking on 	
40 The implied contrast between empirical and metaphysical realism can mislead in various 
ways. I attribute to Kant empirical realism, in the sense of realism about reference. I attrib-
ute to Hegel the view that metaphysical realism, as here defined, is problematic. Nothing 
follows from this about how Hegel deals with continuity, more precisely whether this re-
quires commitment to some form of realism on his part. So, the position I present is sharply 
at odds with Tom Rockmore’s diagnosis about Kant and Hegel’s rejection of metaphysical 
realism in favour of epistemological constructivism (Rockmore 2005: 219). 
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its own claims. Hegel uses dialectic to show the limits of certain forms of 
thought, he then allows these forms to play out in full their limits, in the expec-
tation that there is some further as yet indeterminate object or object domain 
that the concept, in failing its prior determining task, may yet adumbrate, thus 
opening up a new domain of philosophical enquiry.41 The effect of this proce-
dure is twofold: the proper limits of concepts are set, but because they are set in 
a dynamic fashion, by allowing over-extension of concepts, there is no absolute 
limit to conceptual reach and so no limit to the unifying process as a whole; ig-
norance is relativized to particular epistemic expectations attached to particular 
concepts, which they partly meet partly fail and so on. 
Guiding Hegelian unification are three basic theses about cognition, which 
I reconstruct below and illustrate with reference to the “Philosophy of Nature” 
and the “Philosophy of Mind”. 
(a) The first thesis concerns the cognitive insufficiency of concepts use that pre-
sent as having too few links to other concepts or as inadequately differentiating 
between essential and nonessential characteristics of the object studied.  
In the discussion of nature, Hegel describes these as giving us the “exter-
nal” relations of nature. The cognitive problem arises thus: “in the sphere of na-
ture contingency and determination from without has its right, [...] especially 
concrete individual forms, [...] the immediately concrete is a form of properties 
external to one another and more or less insufficiently related to one another” 
(EN §250: Remark 23). Given the task, which is to conceptualise the “infinite 
wealth and variety of form” (ibid.) of nature for the purpose of studying it, these 
external relations are a problem: “nature everywhere blurs the essential limits of 
species and genera by intermediate and defective forms, which continually fur-
nish counter examples to every fixed distinction” (EN §250: 24). Parallel diffi-
culties arise in the study of mind: if we stay in the context of ordinary 
“knowledge of men” which is limited to their “particularities, passions and 
weaknesses” (§377: E 9). Amassing such knowledge cannot give knowledge of 
the “universal”, of “mind itself” (ibid.).42 
(b) The second thesis is that for each domain, a systematic set of hierarchically 
ordered concepts is discoverable that stands in ordered relations to other do-
mains.  
In the case of nature to grasp the idea of it we need to look at the detail of 
“its various specifications and then bring them together” (EN §244: 4). The 	
41 In the “Philosophy of Nature”, for example, Hegel writes that it is through its own dia-
lectic that nature “breaks though the limitation of this sphere” and attains the “higher 
stage”, which is “Mind”. This is a prime example of how Hegel uses dialectical over-
extension of a concept to relate different object domains. From one point of view the 
claim is incredible, mere over-extension. From another point of view, notably the section 
on the soul in the “Philosophy of Mind”, it opens up for philosophical discussion a 
whole range of features such as age, physical location, affective state of being, which af-
fect minds but are also of natural givens, and so help clarify concepts of selfhood and self-
control. 
42 While Hegel’s way of putting the problem may sound old-fashioned, the problem he 
describes has been central to the philosophy of biology, even when pluralism is proposed 
as the best solution (see Dupré 2012); and philosophically, it is a legitimate question to 
ask after the essential possibilities of things. For a more robust defense of Hegel’s argu-
ment see Houlgate 1998. 
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“thinking consideration of Nature” (EN §246: 6) systematises and unifies 
through examination of the different “specifications”, that is, theoretical at-
tempts to explain how different elements, features, relations, and so on relate to 
one another. The test is whether the concepts by which “progression and transi-
tion” in nature can “be made clearer” (EN §249: Remark 20).43 So while the 
unificationist aims provide some criteria for testing, it is also the case that the 
project is bounded by the theoretical material available to philosophical scruti-
ny, namely the concepts in use by specific sciences. The idea is that by focusing 
more narrowly on the ways in which nature confronts us as an object of study, 
in mechanics, physics, organics, it will be possible to generate a dialectic suffi-
ciently potent to identify concepts that have a legitimate claim to objectivity, 
which does not derive just from the currency of their use in the natural sciences. 
The “totality” (EN §244: 4) that unification ultimately seeks is not a mereologi-
cal aggregate, nor yet artificially organised; it is a systematic unity that has not 
lost its contact to the multiform natural given. 
In the study of mind, the dialectic is conducted through criticism of existing 
unifying projects, such as rational psychology, for example, the study of the soul 
and its attributes, which Hegel dismisses as “pneumatology”, “an abstract met-
aphysic of the understanding” (EM §378: 11). The problem is that it treats the 
mind—or soul—as an inert thing with properties, e.g. simplicity and immaterial-
ity. He is equally critical of empirical psychology, which makes the mind object 
of scientific study, but effectively dissolves it into a multitude of explanatory no-
tions such as forces and faculties that correspond to the various things minds do 
(EM §381: 12). Again, we can characterise unity proleptically as a notion that 
makes space for the activities described in empirical psychology, but not as a 
“mere aggregate” (EM §381: 12), and makes sense of the properties identified in 
rational psychology, but not as belonging to an inert substance. While formally 
the process of unification parallels that of the “Philosophy of Nature”, the aim is 
no longer objectivity and scientificity—at least as these might be ordinarily un-
derstood—but the proper understanding of mind, which is subject and object of 
the study; accordingly, the vocabulary describing the success of unification is 
more demanding and task specific and, therefore, defies quick summary (see 
EM §386: 22-24).  
The systematic expansion of object domains, such that include domains 
that are conceptually elusive (nature) or only abstrusely characterised (absolute 
spirit or mind), amounts to the expansion of the critical study of the range of 
conditions of cognition, that is, the relevant unifying concepts. Thesis (b) estab-
lishes that if these conditions don’t apply some others do; as a result, Hegel 
manages to relativise anything that would play the role of the negative epistemic 
criterion which, on his criticism of things in themselves, yields an ontological 
one with disastrous consequences. But it is thesis (c), below, that closes the door 
on the possibility of some a priori unknowables, by spelling out what exactly is 
at stake in unification. 
(c) The third thesis is that unification can count as a cognitive gain, if the ac-
complishment of the unification task is not decided ad hoc, but rather obeys a 	
43 In the fuller account given in the Logic Hegel describes how the new concept is also 
“higher and richer than the preceding—richer because it negates or opposes the preced-
ing and therefore contains it, and it contains even more than that, for it is the unity of it-
self and its opposite” (SL-dG 33; cf. SL-M 54). 
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criterion that is the same across the whole range of domains, yet also internal to 
each; the only criterion that fits, and is such that it does not allow for any re-
mainder, is if the achievement is stated as form of self-relation. 
Self-relation is not a mark of cognitive gain, if we consider it a trivial mat-
ter; nor is it a cognitive gain, of the type sought, it we consider it an eternal 
truth. Hegel describes a relation between thought and thought, e.g. the philo-
sophical analysis of the organising concepts of the natural sciences, which aims 
at identifying the appropriate form of thought at every stage and with regard to 
every object domain of reflective thinking. The systematic and critical demands 
that shape this kind of self-relation—which continues, after a fashion, the pro-
ject of the self-criticism of pure reason—sustain its cognitive ambitions and give 
some means by which to judge what is gained at different stages of unification.44  
 
3.2. Open-Mindedness and Particularity 
The Hegelian species of idealist naturalism, as presented so far, seems entirely 
taken by the tasks of unification and testing, leaving no obvious entry point for 
what we called at the start a realistic account of the relation between thought 
and nature that can sustain continuity. More generally, the very ambition of 
Hegelian unification can raise a question about the possibility of making a con-
vincing case, within the system, about the reality of the source material that 
gives us the object of our “thinking study” (EL §1: 4). I will argue that continui-
ty is served by a position that attempts to give more precise shape to the particu-
lars identified in the Kantian defence of realism about reference. The Hegelian 
version resembles semantic realism, insofar as it is about the relation between 
meaning and meant for a range of value terms. The similarity can mislead 
though, because, on Hegel's account, the relation can be one of perfect match, 
which would leave the two relata only conceptually distinct. The basic argu-
ment, which does not easily fit contemporary philosophical categories and posi-
tions, is a defence of “actuality”. 
By way of introduction, it is useful to consider a criticism Hegel addresses 
to Kant concerning the doctrine of things as they are in themselves, which does 
not target the epistemic damage incurred by its ontological commitments, but 
rather the limitations of Kant's metaphysical ambition. In the Encyclopaedia Log-
ic, Hegel writes: “the things immediately known are mere appearances—in other 
words, the ground of their being is not in themselves but in something else” then 
takes Kant to task for failing to take the “step of defining what this something 
else is” (EL §45). 
One way to interpret this complaint is as if it came from a rationalist meta-
physician: the request for ground is the request for what accounts for the things 
immediately known. Hegel would then be asking Kant to provide a sufficient 
reason why things known are as they are. The request presupposes belief that 
such reason exists (whether known to us or not). Such belief is justified on the 
basis of commitment to PSR. As we said earlier, PSR is regressive, leading to a 
necessary being that stops the regress. But PSR has a logical as well as epistemic 	
44 The interpretation and indeed the formulation of thesis (c) depends on the unificationist 
topic of this section; other more familiar ways of stating (c) include subject-object identi-
ty, or the speculative closing of the gap between spontaneity and receptivity (see Sedg-
wick 2012); or the gap between ontology and epistemology (see Miolli 2018).  
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and metaphysical role, and as such it responds to explanatory demands of a par-
ticular subset of events, those that are the product of intelligent action. No 
mechanistic explanation provides sufficient reason for those, because mechanis-
tic explanations do not have the requisite internal connection between intelli-
gent choice and action; only reasons do this, and ultimately only reasons that 
are formed of valuations concerning what is best to do. This is Leibniz’s deep 
insight into PSR: it is intimately connected with the doctrine that actions are 
undertaken under the guise of the good. If we look at the world as the result of 
divine choice and action, then PSR guides us to the idea of optimality as ex-
planatory for the divine choice embodied in the creative act. It is for this reason 
that Kant himself in his pre-critical writings adopts a form of PSR he terms “de-
termining reason”, meaning a reason that explains the existence of contingent 
beings. Theodicy just falls out of this set of connections. I think this interpreta-
tion of Hegel’s complaint is not the right one, but it is one that matters for un-
derstanding his positive claims. 
 Another way of interpreting Hegel’s complaint about Kant’s silence over 
grounds is that he identifies a weakness in Kant’s defence of realism about refer-
ence, namely that it leaves something out that matters for realism.45 The thought 
is this: a description of experience that only allows for spatio-temporally indexed 
instantiations of properties leaves out an essential part of that same experience, 
namely that it consists of encounters with particulars. If a way can be found to 
attend to this feature of experience philosophically, then that of which we make 
a thinking study will have been acknowledged and the continuity demand ful-
filled. But how can we attend to this feature of experience? All we have at our 
disposal, besides spatio-temporal indices, which don’t give us more than posi-
tions in a grid, are concepts and concepts are promiscuous. The sort of attention 
Hegel considers appropriate is the sort that explains how a particular is the way 
it is; the aim is not to show how it is for some subject, which is the phenomeno-
logical way of attending to the particularity of experience, but rather to show 
how the particular stands objectively as such in relations that uniquely identify 
it. This is what the theory of actuality, he sets it out in the Science of Logic, aims 
to achieve. 
When Stroud recommends “open-mindedness” (Stroud 1996: 54) as gen-
eral philosophical policy, he could not have in mind the Science of Logic despite 
the fact that it presents itself as an example of extreme open-mindedness, or in 
Hegelian terms “presuppositionlessness”. There is a long and interesting debate, 
about the nature of “presuppositionlessness”, or whether it is achievable, desira-
ble, and to what extent Hegel achieves it.46 This debate is not directly relevant to 
the problem at hand, though of course it does give an idea of the distinctiveness 
of the Logic, which is also a unificationist project: the object domain is forms of 
thought. But it seems odd to try to describe, in parallel with other unification 	
45 I believe that what I am about to argue resonates, while differing in detail and material 
for the argument, with Paul Redding’s diagnosis regarding the notion of the “singular” 
(Redding 2007) and its fate in the analytic reception of Hegel’s philosophy esp. the diag-
nostic chaps 1 and 2. On a conciliatory interpretation of his work on the logical singular 
and my claims about actuality these are two ways of reaching the same goal; however, 
Redding has also championed actualist interpretations of Hegel that are at variance with 
mine. 
46 See e.g. Winfield 1990, Houlgate 2006. 
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projects, a relation between forms of thought and concepts. Furthermore, at this 
level of abstraction, it seems very difficult to show that the forms of thought are 
sufficiently constitutively independent to what it is they determine and so wor-
thy of a dialectical examination to prove their claim to thought. This is where 
the rationalist metaphysical position outlined earlier is helpful in clarifying is go-
ing on in the Logic. Hegel’s aim is to show that forms of thought can be deter-
mined and that their determinations can be shown to be right, without external 
rightness criteria.47 How this comes to be a philosophical problem can be illumi-
nated through PSR. If PSR is assumed and the divine mind and will are brack-
eted out of the account, what is left is a demand for a “determining” reason 
(Kant’s adaptation of “sufficient”). Absent the regress-stopper, the demand 
translates as a philosophical examination of what sort of determining determin-
ing reason does. The logical object is the function of determination, which He-
gel calls, determinateness or Bestimmtheit. So, unification aims at the perfect de-
termination of Bestimmtheit.  
The logical unifying project is carried out just like other unifying projects, 
through a priori reflection on candidate forms of thought that have a prima facie 
legitimate claim to persist in thought. Determinateness or Bestimmtheit is the 
achievement of determination. After consecutive partial successes and partial 
failures of determination, the Logic reaches, in the penultimate section, the topic 
of the good. The gradual transformation of the task of determination from logi-
cal to axiological corresponds to the Leibnizian insight that PSR and GG are 
connected or that there is an explanatory nexus between determining reason and 
goodness; goodness is the ultimate explanation. At the same time, in the context 
of the Logic, full determinateness is the achievement of the perfect particularisa-
tion of the form of thought it is about, so full determinateness is in itself the real-
isation of a value. That the value of determinateness is achieved in the topic 
“good” suggests that the solution to the particularity question is not topic neu-
tral, in other words, that unique determination of particulars is a matter of their 
identification as good. 
In “The Idea of the Good”, one of the problems is trying to determine the 
good or whether something is good.48 This in turn manifests as a problem of de-
terminateness and presents us with the task of identifying what is genuine good 
and separating it from impositionist concepts that stamp “good” on a neutral 
value-free world—“realm of darkness” (SL 731). Impositionism is unsatisfacto-
ry, if we want our ideas to be true. But we are ex hypothesis not in position to 
recognise the true good, since we have no prior determination of it or a way of 
checking how a thought is to be compared with something real. The solution is 
to move away from this static model and think of the good in terms of a practi-
cal form thought. A practical form of thought is not an attempt to copy an idea 
onto reality, but rather to give weight to certain considerations in doing some-
thing, realising some end. With respect to values, or at least good, determination 
is not a theoretical matter of adding but a matter of doing something on the ba-	
47 It is worth noting that presuppositionlessness contains another important clue, a rela-
tion to the Kantian notion of “unconditioned”. So in a way that parallels Kant, it can 
designate the search for a thought that can bring unity across different unifying formal 
systems of thought. 
48 The following is a simplified summary of arguments I have presented in detail in 
Deligiorgi (2020a, 2020b). 
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sis of the good, thus realising the good. But obviously not all such realisations 
are guaranteed to be good, people make mistakes, misread situations, misunder-
stand their own motives and trains of thought. 
A basic way of understanding actuality, as Hegel uses it in this section, is as 
determination that is full, error-free and leaves no room to doubt. In earlier sec-
tions of the Logic, actuality is contrasted with empty possibility and with abstrac-
tion; so something would be actual if it is really possible, so instantiable, and al-
so if it is actually instantiated, and has some content. But since our problem 
now is with the practical determination of the good, we need a different sense of 
actual that tells us more that it is instantiable and that it has some content. We 
want an “actual” that gives us the full good and nothing less than that. The no-
tion of “actual” here is explicable in terms of determinateness that is maximal or 
“complete” (SL 731). This transformation of determinateness into an axiologi-
cal term allows actuality to count as a value, because actuality just is maximal 
determinateness. But this is not just a cheaply earned terminological equiva-
lence: if we say for some region x is actual we are saying that in that region x is 
maximally determined, there is no proposition that is true of that region that 
contradicts x and at the same time x is specified in that region fully, without any 
gaps.  
The upshot of this discussion is that the value of “good” is fully realised, if 
the good becomes actual, that is, if reality is considered as the consistent set of 
all true value propositions.49 A worry can arise here about how a unificationist 
project, which uses contradiction in the dialectical testing of claims, yields all of 
a sudden a characterisation of reality that has the virtue of actuality. Reality, as 
fully determinate, is the result of the progressive clarification through testing of 
the function of determinacy and what is tested is nothing other than the deter-
mining powers of forms of thought with a putative claim to capture reality (or, 
at the start “being” as such). The criterial role of consistency depends on the 
truth of value propositions and this, in turn, depends on the realisation of good, 
in a way that admits of no exceptions, no gaps or contradictions, or some un-
foreseen effect that diminishes the goodness and so on.  
Still there are two puzzles about the actuality of the good, the first about 
how maximal determinateness is achieved, and the second about why it is 
achieved with a value term, namely the good? The first puzzle arises because 
Hegel seems to claim that “good”, a notion that is semantically rich, can have 
extensional relations of fit, of the sort that are possible only with logical or 
mathematical notions. On way to achieve full determinateness is to indefinitely 
enrich the meaning of “good” so that it includes exceptions, conditions and so 
on. But Hegel is not proposing this. Rather he argues that the good successfully 
determines reality if the familiar yet not fully determined notion is correctly at-
tributed in all cases in which it is used. One condition for this is that the subject 
term of the evaluation is fully determined, so that there are no hidden, unknow-
able, or in potentia elements to it. This is just a description of a uniquely identifi-
able particular. The assignation of goodness as a predicate for such a subject is 
the identification of a constituent element of it as its form of goodness: the par-
ticular is not identified with the good, nor is yet an instance of the good, rather it 	
49 I do not use this in a technical sense, “claims” or “sentences” would be just as good, 
the drawback being that they distract for introducing in the wrong place the thought of 
putative subjects making these claims and uttering those sentences. 
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is identifiable as good. This is what allows the goodness of each particular to be 
correctly acknowledged while the term remains stable across all its applications. 
Unique identification is the corollary of the maximal determination of reality: 
this is an abstract definition intended to acknowledge the particular, the missing 
“ground” of the things in themselves.50  
The second puzzle about the value term is relatively easy to solve because 
from the start the enquiry is about the goodness of determinateness and seeks to 
achieve such goodness, which is finally actuality. The twist in the end is that 
such, shall we say intellectual virtues, are not insulated from, but rather form a 
part of a capacious conception of goodness, such that guides actions in practical 
syllogisms. And while actual working scientists may not find much that is di-
rectly supporting their research is such conclusion, the outline given here of He-
gel’s argument about actuality in the Logic suffices, I think, to show the centrali-
ty of his concern with showing how thought about reality can be realistic, that 
is, answer properly to what is.  
 
4. Conclusion  
By way of concluding remarks, I want to draw attention to one distinguishing 
characteristic of the genus idealist naturalist, I sought to describe in this paper, 
namely its commitment to philosophical autonomy. Autonomy is not just as-
sumed; it is earned thought testing. The idealist conception of testing of philo-
sophical claims borrows from rationalist metaphysics the idea that rational or-
ganisation places demands such that mere collections of contingently found 
facts do not meet. The transformation of this idea from one with ontological and 
theistic implications to a pure demand of rational thought, which rational 
thought can and ought to be able to meet through its own resources, is key to 
the vindication of autonomy. The upshot of instituting this internal tribunal is a 
complex unification project—or set of projects—which correspond to the search 
for external checks that contemporary metaphysical naturalisers seek, when they 
turn to the findings of natural sciences. At the same time, in its narrow anti-
supernaturalism, idealist naturalism shows kinship with the broader naturalist 
kind, such as expressed, for example, in Sophie’s remarks to Leibniz quoted at 
the start of the paper. I qualified the anti-supernaturalism as “narrow” to indi-
cate that there is space for transcendent elements and for a conception of the di-
vine in both Kant and Hegel’s thought, simply not as a result of commitment to 
logical or epistemic principles. As for the different ways in which each defines 
the supporting role of philosophy in establishing continuity with the natural sci-
ences by fulfilling a realist agenda, matters are complicated. Counterintuitively, 
what counts as realism for Kant and for Hegel depends on acceptance of idealist 
theses, which are neither straightforward nor uncontroversial even among inter-
preters of their work. The versions I outlined may well seem outlandish and un-
convincing, and therefore inline contemporary naturalists to count their idealist 
cousin as a mere historical curiosity. However, in seeking to broaden the con-
text of understanding and justification for these idealist positions is to allow 	
50 The uniquely identifiable particular in this context is also usefully comparable to the 
particularities Hegel dismisses in thesis (a), which we discussed previously, in the context 
of motivating his unification project. From the vantage point of the Logic, such particular-
ities can be described as insufficiently determinate. 
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consideration of the reasons shared that explain the philosophical possibilities 
Kant and Hegel consider as promising and those they reject. As I argued, key to 
their choices is the weight they both put to our capacity to think, and to the fact 
that once the active nature of the exercise of this capacity is acknowledged, cer-
tain intellectual responsibilities follow that simply cannot be relegated or out-
sourced.51  
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